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Literature on Growth Public Sector Corruption
Large literature on LT adverse impact of corruption on econ
growth & other factors:
I Private investment (Mauro, 1997); human capital
accumulation (Ehrlich & Liu, 1999); income inequality
(Blackburn & Forgues-Puccio, 2007);
I Non-linear and Non-monotonic;
Shortcomings:
1. Public o¢ cials assumed to just exist as distinct group not
truly endogenously determined as occupational choice;
2. Large literature, but many lower-middle income African
economiestwin (high) Corruption-Unemployment issue
often been neglected;
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But, what happens if there were heterogeneous
labour and therefore different type of
unemployment?
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Model with Corruption-Unemployment
I OLG growth model, heterogeneous abilities (skilled &
unskilled) and endogenous occupational choice,
I Unlike Spinesi (2009, JDE),
1. Romerian type IGs & designs-production sector (instead of
Schumpeterian quality ladder), as expanded variety ts
lower-middle income economy better;
2. endogenous public o¢ cials (skilled occupational choice);
3. structural unemployment due to trade union bargaining.
I Key link (through resources spent to conceal), hct :
hct =
 
SLt
ULt
!
illegal income.
I Higher ULt , lower hct a semi-quasi form for the
hidden-economy channel;
I Higher SLt , higher hct Shapiro-Stiglitzs
uemployment-as-disciplinary device.
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Preferences
V h;jt = c
h;j
t jt +
ch;jt jt+1
1+ 
; h = U;SY ;SG ; j = E ; L .
In the absence of corruption possibility, period-specic budget
constraints:
cU ;jt jt + s
Uj
t =

(1  )wUt
bt
if j = E
if j = L
;
cS ;jt jt + s
S ;j
t =
8<:
(1  )[(1  %)wSt   tct ]
(1  %)bt   tct
(1  %)wSt   tct
if h = SY ; j = E
if j = L
if h = SG ; j = E
ch;jt jt+1 = (1+ rt+1)s
h
t ; h = U;SY ;SG ; j = E ; L;
where tct is proportional to expected skilled wage.
Complete bureaucratic participation condition: public o¢ cials
wages is non-taxable.
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Training and Occupational Choice
Threshold ability, aCt , above which individuals choose to become
skilled depends on
(1  ULt )(1  )wUt + ULt bt ,
(1  %)(SYt (1  )wSt + SGt wS + SLt bt)  tct ,
where ht , h = SY ; SG ;SL;UY ;UL are respective probabilities.
.
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Wage-setting and Benet Rate
I Wage-setting: right-to-manage bargaining between a
centralized TU & rms (refer Kester et al (2016) for TUs
inuences in Nigeria).
I Union maximises Vht = (w
h
t   whTt )
h
(Nht )
1 h for h = U;S ,
subject to LD functions. Solution:
wht = (
1  h
1  2h )w
hT
t ;
where whTt = bt(
hL
t )
 {hwh0 ; hL = UL; SL.
I UB (bt = t YtN ) is endogenous to changes in (1) per capita
income, and (2) indexation ratio, determined from govs
budget allocation to social security/benet payments.
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Production
I A perfectly competitive FG sector. Uses unskilled labor
(NUYt ), private capital (K
P
t ), a variety of IGs (xi ;s ;t ,
s 2 (0;Mt));
I Standard IG sector: monop. competitive (Agénor & Canuto,
2015). Firm transforms Mst to xs ;t on 1-to-1 basis;
I Designs (private sector employer for skilled labor):
Mt+1  Mt = (K
G
t
KPt
)&
m
1
(1  %)NSYt
N
Mt :
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Public O¢ cials
I Procurement (Blackburn et al. 2011; Chakraborty and
Dabla-Norris 2011). Corruption opportunies because o¢ cial
can over-report purchase cost;
I Gov demands aggregate gt =  Yt capital goods. Each o¢ cial
procures gt=NSGt units:
1. Low-quality,  < 1 unit; Realized Cost: 1 unit;
2. High-quality, 1 unit; Realized Cost: uniformly distributed  2
[1; max];
I If not corrupt: Procure: gt=NSGt (quality), Spend:
[gt=NSGt ], Claim:  = (1+ 
max)=2 (on avg), Earn:
(1  %)wSt ;
I If corrupt: Procure: [gt=NSGt ] (quality), Spend:
[gt=NSGt ], Claim: t 2 (; max) (optimal), Earn:
(1  %)wSt , plus (t   )[gt=NSGt ] ;
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Public Sector Corruption
I Embezzle public funds if:
p
"
((1  %)wSt   tct)
+(t   1+
max
2 )
gt
NSGt
#
+(1  p)[ tct ]  hct
 (1  %)wSt   tct ,
where hct = f (SLt =
UL
t ) dened earlier.
I Threshold t , above which an o¢ cial opts to corrupt:
t = +
(1  p)
p
(1 %) (k
G
t )
&m1
 [(1  )] 1
NSGt
NSYt
241
p
 
 
SLt
ULt
!35 1 ;
which determines share of corrupted o¢ cials, "t :
"t =
max   t
max    :
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Public Finance and Investment E¢ ciency
I Actual quality of public capital goods:
KGt+1 = G
K
t = (1  "t)NSGt
gt
NSGt
+ "tNSGt 
gt
NSGt
= [1  "t(1 )] Yt ;
I while total claims led:
G It = f(1  "t)[(0:5)(1+ t )] + "t [(0:5)(t + max)]ggt :
I Compute public investment e¢ ciency ratio, 't , endogenously:
't =
GKt
G It
:
I Share of public o¢ cials, SGt = N
SG
t =N, determined from
allocated GGt , which is a constant G of revenue;
(1  %)wSt NSGt = G ffwUt NUYt + NSYt [(1  %)wSt   tct ]g
+(1  p)"t(1  %)wSt NSGt g:
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Parameterization
Parameterize to Nigeria, using primary published data by NBS
Nigeria. Initial Steady State:
Variable Description Value Variable Description Value
SU Share of unskilled workers in population 0.847 P Corruption rate 0.336
SS Share of effective skilled workers in population 0.141 U Social security/benefit rate, to per capita income 0.020
SSG Share of (effective skilled) public officials 0.002 k G Public-private capital ratio 0.160
SSY Share of effective skilled workers in private sector 0.103 Y/KP Final output-private capital ratio 0.524
SSL Skilled unemployment rate 0.036 m Blueprint-private capital stock ratio 0.100
SUY Share of unskilled workers in private sector 0.741 dD Optimal threshold cost for inflated reporting 1.246
SUL Unskilled unemployment rate 0.106 j t Public investment efficiency 0.285
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Policy Experiments
1. Obasanjo governments Public Sector Downsizing in 1990s (a
cut in G );
2. Buharis Social Intervention Scheme (a rise in share of social
benet spending, S );
3. Ambitious Social Reform (rise in S , cut in , unionization
reform, U cut), coupled with an increase in Public
Investment (I ).
In addition to Benchmark, we also consider (i) endogenous
p,
p t = Ýpt?1ÞWPÝpm N
#
PtN tSG
Þ1?WP
; (ii) linear specication for concealment cost ( = 1:0); (iii)
endogenous threshold model.
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Public Sector Downsizing
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Increase min income by raising social benet spending
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Ambitious Social Reform, with Public Investment
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Thank You
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An imperfect equilibrium with corruption and unemployment is a
sequence of consumption and saving allocations
fch;jt jt ; ch;jt jt+1; sh;jt g1t=0, for h = U; SY ; SG , j = E ; L, prices of
production inputs fwUt ;wSt ; rt+1g1t=0, existing blueprint varieties
fMtg1t=0, private capital fKPt g1t=0, public capital fKGt g1t=0, such
that, given initial stocks M0;KP0 ; K
G
0 > 0,
a) all individuals, skilled or unskilled, employed or unemployed,
publicly or privately employed, maximise utility by solving their
inter-temporal problems;
b) public o¢ cials maximise utility by choosing the cost to report
(hence to corrupt or not to corrupt), taking the overall distribution
of , the probability of being detected, the quality of the nal
goods, and public funds allocated for public investment as given;
c) rms in the nal good sector maximise prots by choosing
labour, private capital, and intermediate inputs, taking factor
prices as given;
d) IG producers set prices so as to maximise prots, given the
perceived aggregate demand curve;
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Balanced Growth Equilibrium
A balanced growth equilibrium is an equilibrium with corruption
and unemployment in which:
a) fch;jt jt ; ch;jt jt+1; sh;jt g1t=0, for h = U; SY ; SG , j = E ; L, and KPt ,
KGt , Yt , w
U
t , w
S
t , bt , grow at the constant, endogenous rate 1+ ,
implying that the blueprint-private capital ratio and the
public-private capital ratio is constant;
b) the rate of return on capital, 1+ rt+1, is constant;
c) the threshold ability level, aCt , is constant;
d) the threshold level of cost above which public o¢ cials opt to
corrupt, t , is constant;
e) the fractions, UYt , 
SY
t , 
SG
t , are constant;
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Balanced Growth Equilibrium
f ) the proportion of the public o¢ cials who are corrupt, "t , is
constant;
g) the benet indexation variable (as a ratio of income per capita),
t , is constant;
h) the price of intermediate goods Pt and the fee Qt , is constant;
i) skilled and unskilled unemployment rates, ULt and 
SL
t , are
constant; and
j) employment and unemployment probabilities, UYt , 
SY
t , 
SG
t ,
and ULt , 
SL
t are constant.
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